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Abstract
Increasing supply chain velocity has adverse consequences for consumer product goods
manufacturers, but creates value and flexibility for retail stores. This thesis outlines a case study
of a rapid replenishment pilot project between the food manufacturer General Mills, Inc. and
their retail customer Giant Eagle. We outline constraints that General Mills had to impose upon
their customer so it could remain profitable and retain its efficient operating strategy. We offer
recommendations to General Mills on how to grow and sustain their rapid replenishment
business.
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Introduction
This thesis was sponsored by General Mills, Inc. Kevin Fitzpatrick, Dave Jackett, Kathy
Jackson, Cathy Ruehl, Amy Baker, and Stan Sherfinski made up the core team of General Mills
employees who provided the inspiration, insight, and data for the analysis below.
1.1 Motivation
This thesis describes the effects of creating a "high velocity" supply chain policy for a General
Mills distribution center in Ft. Wayne, Indiana. This distribution center handles thousands of
General Mills SKUs and services retail customers in ten states. In the past few years, the most
dynamic General Mills customers have looked at their supply chains to lower the cost of doing
business and to drive profits. To respond to and sometimes preempt customer demands, General
Mills has adopted new operating policies and invested in new technology to achieve efficiencies.
Giant Eagle is an innovative grocery retailer in the Northeast United States. They are a
major customer for General Mills, and has grown larger and more profitable in the past few
years. Aiming to become an industry leader in innovation, Giant Eagle has invested heavily in
restructuring their organization, and has developed collaborative relationships between
functional groups, as well as with their suppliers. In 2001 Giant Eagle requested that General
Mills decrease lead time for orders in order to reduce inventory levels, create fresher product,
lower operating expenses, and drive growth and profitability. In 2006, after other types of
collaboration, a rapid replenishment pilot was initiated. This thesis examines this year-long pilot
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project between General Mills and Giant Eagle. We will discuss the incremental steps taken, the
goals achieved, and reasons for success.
1.2 Outline
This thesis will define what rapid replenishment means for a consumer product goods
manufacturer, and review the relevant models and metrics that are published in supply chain and
business literature. We show how velocity is meant to drive growth and profitability for
General Mills' customers, and also for General Mills. In Chapter 3 we discuss General Mills'
current operations and strategy. In Chapter 4 we describe a rapid replenishment pilot project
with Giant Eagle. In Chapter 5 we analyze mixed results from the first six months of this pilot
project. In Chapter 6, we recommend changes in operating processes and systems that would
help General Mills achieve a successful rapid.replenishment policy, securing growth and
profitability.
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Literature Review
2.1 Supply Chain Performance Metrics
This section describes approaches for classifying supply chain metrics that will be used in the
following chapters. We discuss interactions and tradeoffs between metrics.
It is important to have the right measures in place, and so a company can react in a timely
and accurate way to supply chain issues. In order to build an effective performance
measurement system it is important to establish a set of evaluation criteria, and to identify the
inherent tradeoffs and interactions between those criteria (Caplice and Sheffi, 1994).
Debra Hofman suggests that managers divide organizational metrics into three levels to
give a more detailed view of supply chain performance. Each level serves a different purpose.
The first set allows executives to assess the overall health of supply chain. The second level is
more detailed, and is used for the diagnoses of supply chain issues. The lowest level uses a
variety of metrics that support effective root-cause analysis and enable precise corrective action.
In analyzing metrics relevant to rapid replenishment, we use this paradigm to assess metric
performance (Hofman, 2004).
There are several best practices in metric portfolio design. First, a performance metrics
system should be organized by process rather than by function. The metrics portfolio should be
balanced against cost, quality, time, and effectiveness, and be cross-functional to avoid "siloed"
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behavior. Second, how well a company measures data, as well as how well they act upon those
measurements, is more important than the amount of data measured. Third, different goals
require different metric portfolios. For example, people at various levels within the company
need to know different information about how the supply chain is performing. Fourth, it is
essential to keep each metric portfolio small, focusing on the few metrics that really matter. The
more metrics are in a company's portfolio, the more difficult is to collect consistent and valid
data that can be useful for decision making (Hofman, 2006).
Larry Lapide divides metrics into three groups according to the operating strategy and
performance objectives that a company is pursuing: Customer Response, Efficiency, and Asset
Utilization (Lapide, 2006). These metrics are outlined in Figure 1.
Customer Response (Customer-Facing)
Order Cycle Times
*Perfect Order Fulfillment
-Quality
-New Product Time-to-Market
(Not on Financial Statements)
Efficiency (Internal) Asset Utilization (Internal)
-Labor Productivity -FacilityUtilization
.SupplyChain Costs -inventory Turns(Relate to Income -Cash-to-Cash Cycle
Statements) (Relate to Balance Sheet)
Figure 1: Aligning Operational Performance to Business Goals
Customer response metrics are used to assess the performance of operations that are
directly related to customers. Emphasizing these types of objectives is important for companies
working with high-margin products. Efficiency metrics measure how well a supply chain
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convert inputs to outputs. Efficiency metrics are directly related to income statement. Asset
utilization metrics show how effectively assets such as facilities and inventories are being used.
They can be used effectively to maximize the use of production equipment. Asset utilization
metrics are related directly to the balance sheet.
To achieve a competitive advantage, a successful supply chain strategy should be focused
on no more than two types of performance objectives. If a company pursues all possible
performance objectives, it lacks focus and competitive advantage.
2.2 Push, Pull and Push-Pull Supply Chain
Management Strategies
The previous section introduced the concept of supply chain metrics. This section defines push,
pull and push-pull strategies, and their strengths and weaknesses. The next sections (2.3-2.5)
describe tools that companies use to implement push, pull, and push-pull demand management
strategies.
Traditionally two supply chain strategies have dominated supply chain management:
push and pull. In a push-based supply chain strategy all production and distribution are based on
forecasts rather than on specific customer demand. Typically, the manufacturer sets production at
a level in according to a long-term forecast which is based on historical ordering patterns from
retailers, and uses sales force and sales promotion methods to push product through distribution
channels. An example of this is PC manufacturing. Usually, a PC manufacturer builds to stock
and hence makes all production and distribution decisions based on forecast. A push system has
its weak point. Since "forecasts are always wrong" and "the longer the forecast horizon, the
worse the forecast," it is difficult to predict customer demand and thus match supply and demand
(Simchi-Levi, et al, 2003). Thus, a push system is very susceptible to bullwhip effects.
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Pull production and distribution strategy are based on specific customer demand. If
following a pure pull strategy, a manufacturer will only produce goods actually ordered by
customers. The manufacturer holds no inventory, but instead produces to order. Toyota
exemplifies this strategy, only producing cars that have been ordered by customers. In a pull-
based supply chain, production and distribution are based on actual demand and fulfill actual
customer orders rather than forecasted demand (Simchi-Levi, et al, 2003). On the surface, such a
system is attractive because it allows the firm to eliminate inventory and the associated costs,
eliminate the bullwhip effect, and increase service levels. The pull strategy, however, does not
work when lead times are too long to react to demand in a way that satisfies the customer. A pure
pull strategy also makes it more difficult to take advantage of economies of scale, because
production and distribution are based on demand, and therefore only scheduled as needed.
These advantages and disadvantages of push and pull supply chains as well as new
information technologies that emerged in the last few years have enabled the creation of a third
strategy, a hybrid push-pull strategy that offers the best of both push and pull strategies. Under
push/pull strategy, a production and distribution strategy is based upon a combination of
forecasts and specific customer demand (Simchi-Levi, et al, 2003). For instance, a manufacturer
might purchase component parts based upon sales forecast, but manufacture finished goods only
upon actual customer orders. Dell Computer's supply chain is such an example. In the push part
of a push-pull supply chain the focus is on cost minimization, while in the pull part of the supply
chain the focus is on service levels. In the push stage of the supply chain, typically the initial
stage, long-term forecast has small uncertainty and variability. It is conditioned by the fact that
demand for a particular component or raw material is an aggregation of demand for all finished
products that use this component or raw material. This allows a manufacturer to take advantage
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of aggregate forecasts, which are more accurate and have less variability, and focus on economy
of scale and cost reduction. On the other hand, in the pull stage of the supply chain, which can be
the assembling of finished products, uncertainty and variability in product demand is high and
the focus is on matching supply and demand.
The point at which a supply chain switches from building to forecast, to reacting to
demand from its end customers, is called the push-pull boundary. The push-pull boundary is
identified by the level of uncertainty in supply chain: the portion of the supply chain where
uncertainty is relatively small is managed by using a push strategy (e.g. procurement). On the
other hand, the portion of the supply chain where uncertainty is relatively high is managed based
on realized demand, or a pull strategy (e.g. production, distribution).
2.3 Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) and Joint
Managed Inventory (JMI)
This section describes inventory management theories that enable supply chain management
strategies. Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) and Joint Managed Inventory (JMI) are defined,
and examples of their implementation are outlined.
2.3.1 Vendor Managed Inventory
Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) is a warehouse replenishment program where a
supplier defines inventory levels of each of the products, and the policies to maintain those
levels. Customers welcome VMI when they are too small to manage their own inventory, or
when they are large and seeking new value to pass on to consumers. Suppliers welcome VMI
when they can improve their understanding of demand.
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Successful implementation of VMI comes with many benefits. It can be characterized by
a high level of trust between the customer and the supplier. And not only do the customer and
supplier trust each other, but also trust that their information systems are doing a good job of
reporting on customer demand, and that their systems are accurately reporting the operations
being used to meet that demand. The process to summarize demand is clear, as well as the flow
of goods through the manufacturing and distribution processes. The vendor has complete control
over the product, making sure the right levels of inventory exist both at the supplier and
customer distribution centers, as well as the customer stores. Products' lead times are
predictable and controlled. Finally, the customer trusts that their supplier only ships what can be
sold, and that the supplier is interested in boosting profitability for the entire supply chain. If
partners do not cooperate, it is possible for the manufacturer to take advantage of a VMI
relationship and push costly inventory down the supply chain.
The supplier Baxter pioneered vendor managed inventory policies in the pharmaceutical
industry. They sorted through vast amounts of data to find the A items that its customers really
cared about. In focusing on the 20% of SKUs that drove 80% of stock outs, Baxter developed a
streamlined process to count and replenish the most troublesome items. Baxter took full surveys
of A-item stock outs, statistical surveys of other stock outs, and replenished based on cost and
frequency of a stock out.
Baxter had a specific formula to identify collaborative customers. The executive staff
met and agreed to share the cost of the new program pilot. Then a team of vendor sales reps met
with various people in the customer's organization, to identify discrepancies between what
product was needed, and what product was supplied. Getting buy-in throughout the customer's
organization was key to rolling out an effective VMI process. The customer employees had to
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be the ones to discover and own any problems with inventory management. The customer found
a problem, and the vendor provided a solution.
Ultimately, there were four processes put in place, depending on the cost of a stock out
and the volume of stock outs. The most critical items were given the most attention and
inventory space, while least critical items were only counted once a quarter and stored at a
customer's distribution center. Items with high turnover were given more shelf space than those
with low turn.
The first iterations of VMI at Baxter failed because of a lack of buy-in and trust at all
levels of the organization. But once Baxter proponents obtained executive support and trained
their sales team to collaborate with hospital staff to find common solutions, they were able to
achieve unprecedented levels of customer satisfaction. True VMI has to be hands-off, otherwise
the vendor and customer are duplicating efforts and wasting time as well as inventory resources
(Short, et. al., 1992).
The major barrier to VMI success is not technological. Electronic Data Interchange (EDI)
and barcoding as well as cheap computing power and good planning software (eg. JDA, Demand
Solutions, i2) are readily available. The barrier is winning the customer's trust that his inventory
will be better managed by the vendor. The reason to introduce VMI is the changing nature of
demand. Demand needs to be frequently monitored at the consumer-level, and communicated to
the vendor's forecasters and planners.
Promotions are the largest barrier to VMI, and are usually handled on an exception basis.
The customer should only move to VMI if the vendor can manage and forecast these demand
shifts better than the customer can. Another con of offering VMI to customers is the difficulty of
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achieving critical mass. Unless most of a vendor's volume is forecasted with VMI, it does not
make sense to integrate VMI into MRP systems.
2.3.2 Joint Managed Inventory
Joint Managed Inventory (JMI) or Co-Managed Inventory (CMI) are hybrid versions of
Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI). The vendor/supplier and the customer/retailer have specific
roles that are defined in the sales and operating processes (Sheffi, 2002). Both vendor and
retailer have input on how much material is transferred to the retailer. Such operating
environments are particularly useful when managing promotional activity.
CMI is often employed when VMI fails to achieve planned goals. In 1998, Kmart went
from 300 VMI to 50 CMI relationships. This addressed the lower service levels that retailers
saw when going purely to VMI (Sheffi, 2002).
2.4 Collaborative Planning, Forecasting and
Replenishment (CPFR)
This section describes another supply chain initiative which is aimed to enhance supply chain
integration by supporting and assisting joint practices.
Collaborative Planning, Forecasting and Replenishment (CPFR) is the sharing of
forecasts and related business information among business partners in the supply chain to enable
automatic product replenishment. CPFR is designed to improve the flow of goods from the raw
material suppliers, to manufacturer, to the retailer's shelves. It also is designed to quickly
identify any discrepancies in the forecasts, inventory, and ordering data so that the problems can
be corrected before they can negatively impact sales and profits.
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When engaging in Collaborative Planning, Forecasting and Replenishment (CPFR), a
company shares its sales history, sales projections and other important information with its
business partners, and they in turn share their raw material availability, lead times and other
important information with that company. Then the information is integrated, synchronized, and
used in replenishment.
Yossi Sheffi points out that the main difference between CPFR and other collaborative
arrangements is that under CPFR, both parties are informed of exceptions and the collaborative
process to solving these exceptions is carefully laid out (Sheffi, 2002).
35% of companies in CPG industry have piloted collaborative planning, forecasting and
replenishment (CPFR) initiatives to improve sales and delivery forecasting (Berger, 2003).
However, they only have implemented CPFR with two customers on average, accounting for
only 19% of shipped volume.
2.5 Demand/Customer Driven Supply Networks
This section describes the most recent business model of implementation of pull and push/pull
strategies that appeared in Supply Chain Management and explains the difference of this model
from Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) and Collaborative Planning, Forecasting and
Replenishment (CPFR).
As we mentioned earlier, there are three strategies for managing demand: push, pull, and
push/pull. If a company has a push system, the organization is set up to meet production and
asset utilization goals, and then sells to consumers a predetermined amount. If a company has a
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pull system, the production and supply chain is more flexible, and makes only what the
consumer will buy. A push method is characterized by incomplete or inaccurate demand
information. A pull method is based on real-time demand signals, and requires that a supply
chain respond quickly to this information. Push/pull system is a hybrid system where one part of
the supply chain is managed as a push system concentrating on cost minimization and using
forecasts, while the other part is managed as a pull system focusing on service level and real
demand.
Some pull systems go by new names in the business literature. Consumer-Driven Supply
Networks (CDSN) are also known as Demand-Driven Supply Networks (DDSN), and are such
pull-based supply chain initiatives. Unlike forecast driven supply chains, consumer-driven
supply networks (CDSN) start with real-time demand signals from the consumer. Consumer
purchases trigger real time movement of information back through the entire supply network,
from store to distribution centers to plants. This information flow is what characterizes DDSN
networks, and allows a manufacturer to deliver the correct product at the right time, from the
right place, and for the right price.
The product manufacturing and delivery cycle of CPG companies is usually too long to
make product on order-to-stock basis, which is necessary for a purely pull-based supply strategy.
In such cases of long product manufacturing cycles, DDSN shows characteristics of pull/push
supply chain. On one hand, DDSN uses forecasts and demand planning for manufacturing. On
the other hand, DDSN continuously refines those forecasts based on point-of-sale (POS) data,
consumer traffic, and retailer needs. DDSN integrates business practices, process capabilities,
information and analytics to extend visibility and reduce response time.
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How does a Demand-Driven Supply Network (DDSN) differ from other business models,
such as Vendor Managed Inventory or Collaborative Planning, Forecasting and Replenishment?
The other replenishment models rely on forecast-based processes, while DDSN is based on
immediate actions at the store shelf. Demand signals are received in real time and compared to
the forecast. Then a company responds with an immediate change in replenishment planning.
To make demand-driven supply network (DDSN) a core competency, a company needs
to tighten sales and operations planning process. Production and logistics use information
systems that communicate in real time what consumers are actually buying. Integrated IT
solutions should be implemented in order to transfer demand information through the
organization from warehouse to manufacturing to finance. Finally, non-aggregate point-of-sale
(POS) data should be used. CPG companies use POS today to supplement forecasts, but it
should be used to provide a very clear picture of current buying patterns.
Proctor & Gamble and Cisco are two pioneers of DDSN implementation. They have
reported decreases in warehouse and customer inventories, leading to lower supply chain costs.
Heightened availability to demand data leads to lower forecasting error, which in turn lowers the
amount of expediting and write-offs. And increased supply chain performance leads to more
consumer loyalty.
2.6 Consumer Product Goods Industry Challenges
This chapter describes current state, trends and challenges of the Consumer Product Goods
(CPG) industry.
The consumer packaged goods industry is experiencing an intense competition and cost
restructuring. CPG firms have to respond on reduced demand, slower growth, continuous cost
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pressures, and increased global competition. With the increased levels of product choice in the
market, customers are becoming more demanding. This is why a CPG company's competitive
edge is more and more determined by its supply chain performance and strategy.
In 2003 the Grocery Manufacturers of America (GMA) and conducted a survey among
CPG companies to investigate current supply chain performance and strategies. It found that as
retailers push more responsibility down the supply chain to manufacturers and the demand for
shorter order-to-delivery cycles increases, logistics costs for manufacturers continue to rise.
Logistics costs in CPG industry have increased 12 percent, from 6.6 percent of net sales in 1999
to 7.4 percent in 2002. The growing need for more responsive supply chain is one of the main
contributors to increased logistics costs. For three years starting from 1999, the order-to-delivery
cycle (OTD) has dropped by 79 hours. The order-to-delivery cycle is defined as the elapsed time
from receipt of customer order to delivery of product to the customer's designated location
(Berger, 2003).
A survey of CPG market conducted in 2005 by Grocery Manufacturers Association and
IBM Business Consulting Services proved the tendency in increase of customer service level
(GMA, 2005). According to this survey, major challenge for CPG companies is to cut costs and
to provide a superior level of customer service. Most companies reduced order-to-delivery time
to less than four days on average and are targeting even shorter cycle times of three days. The
customers using VMI and CPFR, on the other hand, enjoyed an order-to-ship cycle time of two
days. Another key customer service indicator, Case Fill Rate, has remained over 99 percent at
General Mills for several years, and General Mills is still working to create even more customer-
responsive operations. There is also a trend toward smaller order sizes, which is conditioned by
the need to process customer orders faster to meet customer VMI and CPFR requirements.
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Although many of CPG companies have order sizes decreased, they aggressively manage
shipments to maintain or increase load sizes and limit the impact of smaller orders on shipments.
The primary function of the CPG supply chain is to make sure that a product is available
when it is required. But it is also important that the product delivery is carried out at the least
possible cost. These conflicting goals are driving CPG companies to work together to find
solutions. Though collaboration companies can drive down cycle times and costs, share
important information, and build joint strategies.
What are the main challenges that CPG supply chain strategies face today? They are
seasonal and unpredictable demand, the influence of large clients, ballooning transportation
costs, and large batch sizes. These challenges are discussed in detail below.
2.6.1 Unpredictable Demand Challenges
Sales in consumer product goods (CPG) companies are usually not order-based. The
companies hence operate on build to stock (BTS) mode. The production process hence is driven
by the forecast figure. Since the accuracy of forecast is modest (from 74% for CPG industry in
average to -85-90% for the best industry performers), the supply chain has to have a high degree
flexibility in order to accommodate this variability (GMA, 2005).
2.6.2 Influence of Large Retail Groups
The key clients of CPG companies are usually large retail chains like Wal-Mart, Kroger,
and Target. Such big clients influence the supply management strategy of CPG manufacturers
from customer service side, promoting higher level of on-time deliveries, quality, and joint
promotion planning.
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2.6.3 Retail Sales
Many CPG companies are increasing the number of retail sales personnel in retailer
locations. These sales people do everything from stock shelves to perform demonstrations in the
retail outlet. The goal is to increase the visibility of retailers and the end-users. In many cases the
retailer does not have the expertise or personnel to promote the CPG product to the individual
end-user. Having CPG sales people in the retail location shows the retailer how dedicated the
CPG firm is to the particular location and helps reduce the work load for the retailer's
employees.
2.6.4 High Transportation Costs
Many CPG products are low-value and high-volume items. The contribution of
transportation costs to the total product cost is often very high. CPG companies can make
significant savings by maintaining low transport costs through optimization of the transportation
model. This optimization should include inbound, internal, and outbound movements to deliver
maximum value. This can be achieved by collaboration with suppliers, customers, and 3PL
suppliers.
2.6.5 Production Cycle Times
In consumer product goods (CPG) plants, production cycle times are often short, which
allows companies to set up new batches frequently. But since plants want to keep their costs low,
they have an incentive to produce in large batches, and minimize manufacturing downtime.
Product postponement can be a solution in some cases, to lengthen the runs of certain processes.
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The goal of any CPG enterprise, as consumer-oriented enterprise is to ensure that the
right product is available at the right place at the right time, in the right quality and at the lowest
possible cost. Stock availability and product freshness are main sales drivers in CPG industry. A
consumer buying a box of cereal won't wait if the desired brand is not available. He will just
pick another brand. So, the supply chain strategy that drives the growth of CPG business should
be the one that maximizes customer responsiveness while minimizing the costs.
2.7 Literature Review Conclusions
This chapter summarizes and draws conclusions from literature research.
In our literature research we explored different supply chain initiatives: VMI, JMI, CPFR
and DDSN. All those business models were created with the same aims: to increase the speed of
customer response, improve demand and manufacturing forecasts, and provide a superior
customer service level. Those models differ by the type of demand that they designated to serve.
For example, VMI is particularly good in the case of stable demand, and can be a burden when
demand is subject to large fluctuations such as those caused by promotions. If a company has a
variable demand signal, but needs to forecast demand because of a long manufacturing cycle,
then CPFR is a particularly good model because it handles order exceptions better than VMI. If a
company's production cycle is more compatible with customer delivery lead time, then the
DDSN strategy can be implemented so a company produces product to order.
The presented supply chain initiatives differ in terms of cost drivers, but they all presume
expenses originate on the supplier side. This tendency is reflected in supply chain surveys.
Companies feel the pressure of conflicting goals, and try to find a balance between minimizing
cost and maximizing service level.
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The CPG industry is one of the most developed industries in terms of supply chain
management. This is conditioned by levels of competition and scale of business, such that
properly designed and managed supply chains become a competitive advantage. To understand
which supply chain initiative is ideal for a company, it is necessary to first understand the nature
of demand and then decide which demand strategy to implement: push, pull, or push/pull.
To measure the effectiveness of new supply chain initiatives, it is important to define the
right metric portfolio. Such a portfolio should cover all three axes of company performance:
customer service, asset utilization and efficiency. Many metrics are correlated, and companies
should make note of the trade-offs between them.
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3 Operating Strategy of
General Mills, Inc.
This section starts with an introduction to the company General Mills, its product lines, and the
customers that it serves. Then the dynamics between the company and its customers are
outlined. This is done by first illustrating the distribution and planning processes used, and then
describing various options the company has to achieve different supply chain goals. Finally,
performance measures used to monitor logistics operations are provided.
3.1 Company Background
General Mills is a $13 billion manufacturer of packaged consumer foods. They employ 28,000
people across the globe, but the majority of their operations are in the United States. They have
a logistics organization that spans multiple product lines, with executive leadership that is
pioneering in its cross-functional purpose and scope.
The food industry is characterized by very stable demand. Most variability is due to
demand management in the form of promotions. General Mills, like others in its field,
differentiates with brand perception, by new product introductions, and by price promotions
coordinated with vendors. General Mills introduces over 100 new items every year, and markets
these heavily with advertising, product placement and price negotiations.
The core of General Mills' sales, suppliers, and operations are in America. General Mills
demand is stable because General Mills has enjoyed being a market leader for years. It is
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currently the number one seller of dessert mixes, dinner mixes, dough, flour, frozen vegetables,
frozen baked goods, fruit snacks, meals, and yogurt. It is the number two seller of ready-to-eat
cereals, frozen snacks, Mexican food, popcorn, and ready-serve soup.
3.2 Existing Supply Chain Network
3.2.1 Products
General Mills' manufacturing and distribution operations are divided into two groups by storage
and transportation requirements. The temperature-controlled group includes products such as
dough, yogurt, frozen baked goods, snacks, and vegetables. All other products are lumped into
the "dry" or ambient temperature group. Compared to refrigerated items, ambient temperature
products are typically lighter, bulkier, cheaper, and have longer shelf lives, longer production
runs, higher inventory levels, and higher sales volumes. Some supply chain metrics for the dry
side of the business vary greatly from the temperature-controlled supply chain. This discrepancy
is due to the nature of the products. Temperature-controlled items can be more expensive to
transport, are typically heavier, average volumes are lower, and their shelf lives require certain
efficiencies in the supply chain.
3.2.2 Customers
General Mills services many retail channels including club (Costco, Sam's), drugstores (CVS,
Walgreens), foodservice (Cisco, US Foodservice), grocery (Kroger, Safeway), and super centers
(Wal-Mart, Target). These retailers deploy varying supply chain approaches depending on their
corporate strategies. General Mills works to accommodate these diverse customer supply chain
needs while maximizing its own growth and profitability. General Mills' largest customers are
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pioneering new technology and business models to achieve growth in sales and in operating
efficiency.
3.3 Functional Perspectives
The balanced scorecard model, created by David Norton and Robert Kaplan, is used to make
sure that the operations of various functional groups are aligned with a single company strategy.
The model identifies four different corporate perspectives that will be incorporated into this
project, to ensure a complete picture of the supply chain. These perspectives are financial,
customer, growth, and internal business processes.
The financial perspectives are provided by the Trade Finance analysts and Sales
departments of General Mills. Customer perspectives are provided by the Customer Service
Center, where representatives take orders from customers and troubleshoot any problems that
arise in the order fulfillment process. Various growth and process perspectives are provided by
all functional groups within the company. However, we found that executive management and
the demand planning groups provide the most input on this front. Managers at General Mills
headquarters in Minneapolis, Minnesota, are driving various methods of continuous
improvement, and focus on forecasting for future operations.
3.4 Supply Chain Organization
This section describes the people that General Mills employs to produce and distribute its
products. The majority of General Mills operations are planned from its headquarters in
Minneapolis, Minnesota. Demand planning, customer service, sales, finance, logistics, and
information systems groups are housed centrally. At the headquarters, functions are further
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divided into Dry Goods, Temperature Controlled Goods, and a few smaller divisions such as
International Sales, and Bakeries and Food Service. The customer service center is a matrix
organization that is aligned by the top 20 customers. The smaller customers are grouped into
geographic regions.
Manufacturing is executed at forty plants distributed throughout the continental United
States. These manufacturing sites typically store work-in-progress and raw materials inventories
for a week's worth of production. Hourly employees operate the production lines, and salaried
employees plan and oversee operations.
Historically finished goods warehouses were set up close to plants to receive finished
goods inventory. Only ten percent of warehouse space is owned and operated by General Mills.
The rest is leased from third party logistics companies. United Facilities and Exel manage most
of the warehouses for dry goods, and AmeriCold manages most refrigerated warehouses.
Figure 2 details the structure of General Mills' "Supply Chain Logistics, Strategy, and
Grain Operations" organization.
VP Logistics
Dry Channel Human Resources Demand Planning
Refrigerated Channel Grain Operations Logistics Planning
Figure 2: General Mills Logistics Organization
The Vice President of Supply Chain Logistics, Strategy, and Grain Operations oversees
the following functional groups, which are headed by directors or vice presidents: Dry Channel,
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Refrigerated Channel, Grain Operations, Human Resources, Information Systems, Finance,
Demand Planning, Customer Strategy, and Logistics Planning.
3.5 Metrics
This section details the metrics that General Mills employees use to gauge operational
performance. The most important of General Mills' metrics are shared across functional groups
and product lines, and are tabulated in Table 1. Metrics of secondary importance, or more
functional focus, are tabulated in Table 2.
Table 1: Metrics Common to General Mills' Supply Chain Organization
Metric Description
Case Fill Cases Shipped / Cases Ordered
Cost Per Case Total Cost of Goods Sold / Total Cases Shipped
Productivity Change in COGS from last year, adjusted for inflation
Operating Profit EBIT
Table 2: Additional Key Metrics of General Mills' Supply Chain Organization
Sales, Marketing, Customer Service, Distribution
Number of cases available at DC/An average number
of cases shipped from CSF per day (can be used for a
Days of Supply at DC particular SKU or for the whole stock)
Turn Case Fill % Cases of Turn (Non-Promotion) Items shipped
Promotion Case Fill % Cases of Promotional Items shipped
Truckload Utilization Truckload capacity used/Truckload capacity
the number of days it takes to convert the expenses for
Cash to Cash cycle raw materials into payment for the finished product
Customer Service
Hours from when an order arrives by EDI, phone or fax
Order Processing Time to when loaded onto a truck
Orders Flagged Number of orders that require handling exceptions
Number of cases ordered by customer and not received
Customer Shorts because they were not available at DC
Customer Inventory Number of times that a customer's inventory cycle or
Turns turns over per year
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By studying General Mills' metrics, we were able to determine a strategic operational
performance goal for the company. Larry Lapide of MIT's Center for Transportation and
Logistics outlined a matrix for determining if a company mainly focused on customer response,
asset utilization, or efficiency. The MIT Supply Chain 2020 Project found that leading
companies were distinguished by having distinct operational goals.
General Mills has metrics for all three operational goals, but efficiency was consistently
named the most critical by leaders throughout the supply chain organization. Figure 3 is a
model developed by Chris Caplice to map different operating strategies against one another. We
interviewed employees from different functional groups within General Mills, and collected the
metrics that they are rated on. Heads of manufacturing (black), transportation (blue), and
logistics planning groups (green) were rewarded for being efficiency-focused, while customer
service (red) representatives were evaluated more by customer response metrics. Table 3
outlines different operational focuses, and the supply chain metrics that are most closely aligned
with each. Since efficiency is the most prevalent focus, the following metrics get a lot of
attention at General Mills: cost per case, productivity, percent of individual cases picked, and
safety/environmental measures.
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Distribution
Number of cases ordered by GMI from manufacturing
Out Of Stocks and were not received at DC
Number of times inventory cycles or turns over per
Inventory Turns year at DC
Sales/Marketing
Number of cases that were ordered by a customer store
Perceived Shorts from a customer DC and were not received
CUSTOMER RESPONSE
Sales
Logistics
Manufacturing
Transportation
S
%
V ASSET
EFFICIENCY UTILIZATION
Figure 3: Operating Focuses of Manufacturing, Transportation, Demand Planning, and Sales
Table 3: Common Metrics and their Relation to Operational Focus
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Focus Metric
Assets Corporate Operating Profits
Manufacturing Uptime
Safety / Environment
Truckload Utilization
Inventory Turns
Customer Case Fill
Retail Out of Stock
Quality
Efficiency Cost per case
Productivity
Individual Cases Picked
Safety / Environment
3.6 Goods and Information Flow
This section describes how five million cases of dry goods flow through the General Mills'
supply chain network. It follows one of two routes to customers: either through the distribution
centers or directly from plants. Approximately 20% of dry goods are shipped directly from
plants.
Direct Plant Ship 20%
Suppliers
Plants
Distribution Center
Customer
Distribution Center
Customer
Stores
Traditional Ship 80%
PJ
Figure 4: DPS and Traditional Flow of Goods from Supplier to Customer
Figure 4 details a flow of goods that starts at the raw material supplier, and is shipped to
plants. Plants typically house a week's worth of raw materials inventory, while distribution
centers normally carry 40 days of inventory. All goods produced at the plants flow to one or
more distribution centers. General Mills also ships finished goods between distribution centers
by truck and by rail. Though historically shipments to customers were organized by General
Mills distribution centers, currently approximately 40% of General Mills shipments are customer
pick up (CPU). CPU trucks are scheduled by the customer and announced to General Mills
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distribution centers at least one day prior to shipment. Organizing CPU allows customers to take
advantage of an allowance from General Mills to offset shipping expenses.
Customer's
Planning
$ 4 Sales, Marketing,
Service and Finance
Representative
Demand and Supply
Chain Planning
Plants Suppliers
Distribution Center
Customer's
Distribution Center
Customer's
Stores
Figure 5: Flow of Purchase Order Information from Supplier to Customer
Figure 5 details the flow of communication between different parties within General
Mills' supply chain. This diagram, aligned with the customer-facing objectives of General Mills,
begins and ends with the customer's planning department and stores. The customer places
promotional and non-promotional "turn" orders through EDI or fax to the service reps at the
customer service center. Forecasts are requested at least four weeks in advance of promotional
orders, which are passed onto the demand planning departments. The demand planning
departments aggregate promotional forecasts with non-promotional forecasts, and set production
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levels. Plants receive weekly production schedules, order raw materials from suppliers, and ship
product as it is finished to distribution centers. Daily turn and promotional orders are released
from the customer service representatives, and orders are filled from finished goods inventory at
the distribution centers. In most shipments to and from distribution centers, except for customer
pick-ups (CPU), truckloads are scheduled from the point of origin.
3.7 Demand Signal and Inventory Control
This section describes how changing the nature of the demand signal will lead to greater
supply chain efficiencies. Currently, demand signals come from heterogeneous sources and the
quality of data is different. Customers' distribution centers and historical shipment data are
primary sources of information.
There are three problems with the current system. First, there is a lack of accuracy in the
historical record of consumer demand, since everything that gets shipped to the customer is not
sold. Second, there exists a bullwhip-type amplification of variability in the demand signal,
because this demand data flows through several channels before it is observed and planned for
by General Mills' manufacturing planners. Third, the demand data is not timely, since there are
delays in transmitting the data to the planners.
Around 40% of General Mills clients have Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) systems
installed. The data that is used for VMI often comes from sales in aggregated product family
units instead of particular stock keeping units, adding complexity to the planning process.
Additionally orders from VMI clients are often changed manually by General Mills sales people
or by request of the clients. All these distort initial demand signals.
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Other retail customers place orders directly to General Mills' Customer Service Center in
stock keeping units. The demand signal usually comes from customers' distribution centers.
General Mills does use Point of Sale (POS) data as a demand source for a very limited set of
customers but is in the process of expanding the number of customers and including it in the
demand forecasting process.
3.8 Information Technology
This section describes the current state of General Mills' information systems that it uses to
enable new supply chain strategies. As the consumer product goods industry shifts in focus from
manufacturing to being responsive to consumer demand, systems have to adapt to new processes
and to handle new volumes of information.
General Mills has been using historical data for both manufacturing planning and several
Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI) systems, which causes General Mills to have lower demand
forecast accuracy than its best-in-class competitors. Measuring at the most detailed level, SKU
at customer location, General Mills has only 60% forecast accuracy, which is below the average
74% in the CPG industry. To protect against major errors in forecasting, General Mills keeps
approximately one month of safety stock on hand at distribution centers. Temperature controlled
items have shorter shelf lives and have much lower safety stock levels.
General Mills uses the following supply chain software and communication standards to
collaborate with its clients and process data: SAP Advanced Planner and Optimizer (APO),
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), and Warehouse Management System (WMS). The company
is going to implement the SAP modules, Transportation Planner and Vehicle Scheduler (TPVS)
and Inventory Collaboration Hub (ICH), which is are internet platforms for collaboration with
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clients and suppliers and can be integrated with SAP APO. The current packages are described
in detail below.
General Mills uses SAP to do demand planning and promotion planning, vendor
managed inventory, transportation planning and vehicle scheduling. SAP Advanced Planner and
Optimizer (APO) module provides tools needed to plan, optimize and execute supply chain
processes. SAP APO enables demand and manufacturing forecasts to be integrated with
historical trends and current promotion plans, as well as marketing intelligence, sales objectives,
and management adjustments to statistical forecast. Such intelligence include aggregated reports
from customers and third-party logistics companies. SAP transportation planning and vehicle
scheduling components will help optimize available fleets of third-party trucks, by scheduling
vehicles and determining routes.
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) is a technology for automated exchange of business
data between dissimilar applications regardless of platform, standard or protocol. It allows
General Mills to receive purchase orders, send invoices, send advanced ship notices (ASN) and
other business documents with fewer errors and lower administrative costs.
General Mills' Warehouse Management System (WMS) is in-house software that runs
most operations at General Mills distribution centers (DCs). WMS controls movement and
storage of products within a warehouse. Data is uploaded to WMS from General Mills' SAP
database every day with orders to be picked, loaded, and shipped from stock. WMS generates an
advanced ship notice (ASN) when an order is shipped. Some customers receive their ASN in the
form of an Electronic Data Interchange document, specifically EDI number 856, an electronic
form for notification of pending deliveries.
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Many capabilities of SAP have been underutilized by General Mills. In 2008, the SAP
Inventory Collaboration Hub (ICH) module will be introduced to assist with collaborative
planning and forecasting efforts between General Mills and their more innovative customers.
The quality of demand forecasts at General Mills is no better than the industry average
since the SAP Trade Planner module is used mainly as a financial planner than as a supply chain
tool. Information about turn and promotional orders are uploaded from the sales' Trade Planner
system in product family units. The demand planning department has to break these aggregate
numbers into how many particular stock keeping units (SKU) to ship. Demand planners make
their decisions based on orders placed in previous years.
Approximately 40% of General Mills' clients have participated in Vendor Managed
Inventory (VMI) programs. The orders generated by sales teams do not always have detail at the
stock-keeping unit level. According to customer service representatives, this lack of information
from sales teams and lack of information from the customers could be important drivers of
forecast error, making the vendor managed inventory not as effective.
Promotional orders placed by General Mills for their customers are very often changed
last minute, once the customer's immediate needs become apparent. There is no process in place
for immediate changes in the demand signal to make their way back to manufacturing, so that
safety stock levels can be adjusted. If exceptions of this sort are not kept in check, distribution
centers will not have sufficient levels of safety stock.
General Mills customer service representatives have to manually edit the specific stock
keeping unit mix of orders. This practice is so ubiquitous that it is not measured. All customer
orders may be manually released to the distribution centers for staging. Current General Mills
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systems are such that service levels are at an astounding 99%, but this due to a culture of service
to the customer, and not a reflection of the efficiency of General Mills' information systems.
3.9 Transportation
Hauling inventory from plants to warehouses to customers is one of the biggest challenges to
profitability at General Mills. General Mills performs delivery from its distribution centers to
customers' distribution centers with the help of third party logistics (3PL) companies. Usually
General Mills delivers only Full Truck Loads (TL). Major metrics used to measure performance
of the transportation group are
" Truckload Utilization - percentage of trailer capacity utilized,
" Transportation Cost - a sum of Freight, Fuel, and additional charges
" Freight Cost/Truck Load.
In 2006, General Mills had approximately 12 million truckloads. To avoid having to
synchronize all unloading of trailers, as well as the schedules of drivers from multiple sources,
General Mills uses a "drop and hook" system for most interplant shipments and some customer
shipments. Trucks drop off supply trailers next to the warehouses and pick up other trailers that
are awaiting shipping to other distribution centers or customer warehouses.
3.10 Warehousing
This section describes another main cost driver in General Mills' business. General Mills owns
some of its own warehouses and also leases warehouses from third party logistics companies
such as Exel. The main metrics used at Warehousing Department are case picking, case fill, cost
per case, and inventory holding costs. Case picking, or the number of cases that are picked not
in full pallets, is usually at 20%. Case fill is a service level metric typically at 99%, which means
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that 99 out of 100 cases ordered by customers were shipped from General Mills door within 48
hours of the order submission. Warehousing cost per case is rolled into manufacturing cost per
case, and is higher for refrigerated goods than dry goods. Inventory holding costs are typically at
12%, although they can reach 20% for seasonal refrigerated specialty items.
Constraints on the warehouse system include the number of loading doors, the size of
staging areas, the height of pallet stacks, and the number of people and forklifts available for
staging and loading. There exists a tradeoff between the size of a warehouse, and the amount of
complexity in distributing a vast number of SKUs. The warehouse group estimates that once
warehouses exceed 700,000 square feet of space, the cost of locating and moving a pallet by
forklift exceeds the gain in warehouse consolidation. Pallets typically take 2 to 3 minutes to
locate and stage for a shipment, but in the largest warehouse, this time can be up to seven
minutes per pallet.
The food manufacturing industry has matured to a point such that the major players
compete on operating efficiency as well as customer service to gain market share. The following
section shows how General Mills has taken its mature manufacturing and distribution operations,
and optimized them for the benefit of an innovative customer.
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4 Rapid Replenishment Project
between General Mills and
Giant Eagle
This section discusses why General Mills is concerned with the velocity of its supply chain. One
of its more collaborative customers is introduced, and the processes and systems that link the two
companies are discussed in detail.
4.1 Supply Chain Velocity
This section describes how the information and goods flows have been accelerated between
General Mills and one of its larger customers, Giant Eagle. General Mills promises most of its
customers a 48-hour lead time for shipments to customer distribution centers. Order-To-
Delivery (OTD) time starts when a customer submits a fax or EDI order, and ends when a truck
is unloaded at the customer's warehouse. In the case of Customer Pick-Up (CPU) shipments, the
OTD time ends when the CPU truck has been loaded. In the case of Drop and Hook shipments,
OTD time ends when the truck trailer has been dropped off next to the customer warehouse.
In a pilot project in 2006, Giant Eagle negotiated that lead time be reduced from 48 hours
to 24 hours. Table 4 lists the activities that happen during lead time, and which have to be
compressed. Instead of the ranges tolerated in 2005, strict deadlines have been set to create a
daily routine that facilitates the order fulfillment process.
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Table 4: Activities that Contribute to Order Fulfillment Lead Time
48-hr 24-hr
Group Activity "Deadline" Deadline
Customer Promotion Planning Place turn/promotion order - EDI 6-1 1am 7am
Check and release order for
Service Representative completeness 9-12pm 10am
Distribution Center Schedule truckload 10-2pm 12pm
Drop and Hook Trailer Staging 12am 9am-2pm
Pick and Stage Regular Shipment 12am 11pm
12am, day-
Load truck/send Shipping Notice before 12am
Customer Distribution Center Receive truck None 7am
Before the rapid replenishment pilot project, Giant Eagle sent General Mills aggregated
store sales data, so the supplier could have additional visibility to consumer demand. This data
helped General Mills manage Giant Eagle's non-promotional inventory. However, when the
pilot started in June 2006, Giant Eagle employees started placing their own orders, and VMI was
discontinued. Giant Eagle continued to send General Mills weekly sales data reports, but
General Mills was no longer responsible for single-handedly managing Giant Eagle's inventory.
Because customer promotional and non-promotional "turn" orders are filled from
inventory at the distribution centers, manufacturing and shipping from plants are not included in
the order fulfillment lead time. Insufficient inventory, duplicate orders, and order exception
handling threaten the success of increased velocity. The following sections detail what happened
to General Mills to Giant Eagle service in 2006.
4.2 Rapid Replenishment Metrics
Employees at General Mills use many metrics to gauge their own and their customer's
operational performance during the rapid replenishment pilot project.
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General Mills uses two groups of metrics to describe the impact of rapid replenishment.
One group measures performance of a customer (Giant Eagle), another group of metrics gauges
effectiveness of General Mills performance. Both metrics and their description are presented in
Table 5.
Table 5: Metrics Used for Rapid Replenishment
Metric Description
Giant Eagle
Cases Shipped from General Mills DC/ Cases Ordered by
Case Fill to Customer DC customer DC
Cases shipped from customer DC/ Cases ordered by
Service to Stores customer stores
Store Out of Stock The number of SKUs that are not available on store shelves
Number of cases available at DC / Average number of
Days Supply of Inventory at DC cases shipped from DC per day
Retail Sales Weekly sales
General Mills
Case Picking Number of cases picked in less than full-pallet quantities
Truckload Utilization Truckload capacity used/Truckload capacity
Transportation Costs Freight + Fuel + Truck Unloading + Detention Costs
4.3 Transportation Enablers of Rapid Replenishment
Section 3.9 discusses General Mills' transportation resources and metrics definitions, which did
not radically change to enable rapid replenishment. Line haul rates between General Mills and
Giant Eagle's distribution centers remained between $500 and $600. To maintain the service
level and increase speed of replenishment to Giant Eagle, General Mills started underutilizing
trailers. As a result, Freight Cost/Truckload went up $11.44 per truckload, causing $275,000 in
additional transportation costs. To offset this negative effect General Mills began to combine
promotional shipments with rapid replenishment shipments. The costs of transportation are
compared with other operational costs in sections 4.12 and 4.13.
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To serve the 24-hour replenishment project, the transportation group dedicated between
five and ten percent of their time to Giant Eagle orders. One of the benefits of rapid
replenishment for the transportation group is smoother everyday volume due to more frequent
deliveries, creating routines which are easier to plan. For example, instead of five trucks going
out twice a week to replenish non-promotional inventory, General Mills delivers one truck to
each Giant Eagle warehouse every day. Shorter delivery time makes the performance of the
transportation group more dependent on upstream resources, such as inventory availability.
4.4 Warehousing Enablers of Rapid Replenishment
Section 3.10 introduces the costs of warehousing, which increase with the implementation of a
rapid replenishment policy. With rapid replenishment case picking increased 19.9% since the
weekly demand for each SKU did not change as rapidly as the increase in order frequency. At
Fort Wayne, the General Mills warehouse that supplied the Giant Eagle warehouses in Pittsburgh
and Cleveland, it took an average of three hours to pick an average order prior to rapid
replenishment, and took an average of eight hours during the pilot. Main problems that would
prevent a full-scale rollout of rapid replenishment include
" a limited number of forklifts
" a limited number of forklift drivers
" a lack of staging space for collecting orders prior to ship
" inventory availability
" focus on case-fill metrics rather than asset utilization metrics
The cost of warehousing is compared with other operational costs in sections 4.12 and 4.13.
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4.5 Data Collected
To identify the results of the rapid replenishment pilot project we used two sets of data from the
General Mills distribution center which serves Giant Eagle and is located in Fort Wayne,
Indiana. The first set of data was from June through November of 2005 prior to rapid
replenishment. The second set was from a year later, June through November of 2006, when the
rapid replenishment program was first adopted.
To evaluate the effectiveness of different replenishment policies, we examined logs of
Giant Eagle orders from 2005 and 2006. We collected order logs for five A-listed SKUs
(Cheerios, Lucky Charms, Hamburger Helper, Yellow Cake, Chicken Soup) for five months
before and during the rapid replenishment pilot.
Though the data was available to demand planners, demand during November and
December was not used in our order analysis. Sales during the Christmas season fluctuated
unpredictably due to an increased number of promotional runs, also was also subject to
fluctuations in shipping availability.
4.6 Giant Eagle Retail Sales
The fluctuations in Giant Eagle Retail Sales are shown in Figure 6. We have disguised the sales
totals but have retained the pattern to show the effects of rapid replenishment.
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Figure 6: Giant Eagle Retail Sales Before and During Rapid Replenishment
Demand has seasonality and varies significantly from week to week. Most fluctuations in sales
can be attributed to promotional campaigns and variations in day-to-day demand. However, the
standard deviation in Giant Eagle's sales decreased from 12% to 8% in 2006. This is because
rapid replenishment presumes more orders per week (consisting of smaller quantities) which
smoothes order flow and decreases the bull-whip effect on the demand signal.
4.7 Store Order Volume
When we look more closely at a few select dry goods SKUs (Hamburger Helper, Yellow
Cake Mix, Cheerios, Lucky Charms, and Progresso Noodle Soup) the total monthly order
volume decreased from 52 to 44 thousand cases. This corresponds to an overall decrease in
inventory by 7 days. Sales to Giant Eagle initially decreased 6% during the first five months
while inventory was being used, but then sales recovered to 105% of last years in months six
through eleven. Figure 7 shows the total order volumes before and during the rapid
replenishment pilot. In keeping with their goal of reducing inventory, the total volume of cases
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ordered by Giant Eagle during the pilot project was 15% lower in 2006 than in 2005. The
majority of SKUs surveyed, with the exception of Lucky Charms, follow this pattern.
Total Order Volumes for Selected Items (in 000's Cases)
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Figure 7: Total Order Volumes Before and During the Rapid Replenishment Pilot
4.8 Order Placement Frequency
During the rapid replenishment pilot in 2006, the frequency of orders went up 60% and the
average size of a purchase order went down. See Figure 8 for the average monthly demand for a
subset of A-item SKUs. Hamburger Helper orders were 20% smaller, Cheerios 28% smaller,
Yellow Cake Mix 54% smaller, Noodle Soup 29% smaller, and Lucky Charms 48% smaller.
Overall order sizes decreased 33%.
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Figure 8: Average Order Size Before and During the Rapid Replenishment Pilot
By aggregating the number of purchase orders that Giant Eagle placed with General
Mills, we see a trend in placement. Over the course of the year, the average number of purchase
orders placed increased 60%, and the number of shipments increased 25%. The variation in
order placement is greater in 2006, meaning that Giant Eagle only gradually took advantage of
the shorter lead times being offered by General Mills. See Figure 9 for a graph of order
placement patterns. The number of September orders are high in both years, marking the
beginning of the Thanksgiving-Christmas baking season.
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Figure 9: Total Number of Purchase Orders before and during the Rapid Replenishment Pilot
4.9 Promotional vs. Non-Promotional Orders
During the beginning of the rapid replenishment pilot, General Mills recognized that the order
placement process was more involved for promotional orders than for turn orders. In June 2006,
General Mills began to record the number of turn versus promotional orders that were placed,
and to record the number of times an order had to be manually reviewed by a customer service
representative. Because of the strategic importance of promotions in driving sales, the service
levels of turn inventories suffered when compared with service levels for promotion. Also, any
turn orders that could not be filled were listed as missed order, and filed again as a new order,
artificially lowering the service levels. Promotional service levels were 98.59% overall in 2006,
while turn service levels were 95.85%. Total service levels were 97.12%.
Figure 10 shows that turn and promotional demand was relatively steady in 2006 from
month to month, except for an expected spike in September as Giant Eagle stocked up for the
beginning of the Christmas season. This also shows that promotional volume was usually 40%
greater than turn volume.
42
Number of Giant Eagle Orders in 2006
140 129
120
103,
100 _--
83
80 U # Unknown
U # Promotional
60- - # Turn Orders
47
4040
20
20
0
Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct
Figure 10: Giant Eagle Orders in 2006, Segmented by Turn or Promotional Inventory
4.10 Handling Order Exceptions
There exist many process exceptions that interrupt the flow of information and goods between
supply chain players. At Giant Eagle, supplier representatives place daily orders for non-
promotional dry goods, while promotional goods are ordered by General Mills demand planners.
Though all orders are entered into the SAP database using Electronic Data Interchange (EDI),
orders often need to be corrected for the following errors listed in Table 7.
Table 7: Data Entry Problems that Drive Order Fulfillment Delays
Order too small
Quantities not acceptable
Item out of stock
Item allocated to another order
Direct Plant Ship is available
Possible duplicate Purchase Order
Promotional price has expired
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Before the 24-hour-OTD pilot started, General Mills did not have access to order change
data. In June 2006, the SAP reporting system was modified to provide the number of order
exceptions placed. However when the pilot started and General Mills started tracking order
exceptions, over 75% of orders had issues. Tracking this problem over the course of two months
led to more uniform order sizes and promotion schedules, and the number of order exceptions
leveled off around 30%.
If there are none of the above exceptions, the order is considered 'perfect', and orders are
released to the distribution centers for truckload scheduling, staging and loading. If there are
exceptions then SAP flags the order and General Mills customer service representatives must call
the customer and then fix the purchase order manually. If an exception is not cleared before
10am, then the order is not counted as placed for that day. This practice may artificially inflate
General Mills' service level metric, which is currently at 99%. In this way, the exception
handling process adds complexity to the order-fulfillment process and timeline.
Figure 11 shows that most of the exception handling came from the promotional purchase
orders. Once General Mills became aware of the causes of exception handling, such as ordering
in partial-pallet and partial-layer quantities, the number of exceptions was lowered to acceptable
levels.
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Figure 11: Promotional Order Changes More Frequent than Turn Order Changes
General Mills also compared the order changes that were initiated by different
distribution centers. Most months showed little difference between the order processes initiated
by Giant Eagle ship-to points Cleveland and Pittsburgh, as seen in Figure 12.
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4.11 Analysis of Rapid Replenishment Metrics
This section continues the analysis of rapid replenishment by looking at key process indicators in
place at General Mills.
Besides retail sales volumes, the other four metrics for measuring Giant Eagle
performance are presented in Table 8 as average weekly data. They are case fill to customer
distribution center, service to stores, store out of stock, and days of supply of inventory at the
customer distribution center.
Table 8: Giant Eagle Performance Metrics
Cumulative weekly average: Year 05' Year 06' Change
Case Fill to Customer DC 97.7% 96.2% (1.5%)
Service to Stores 95.5% 98.4% 2.9%
Store Out of Stock 3507 cases 1089 cases (2418 cases)
Days Supply of Inventory at Customer DC 16.8 days 10.8 days (6 days)
4.11.1 The Relation between Case Fill to Customer Distribution Center and
Order-To-Delivery Time
The value of the "Case Fill to Customer Distribution Center" metric decreased by 1.5%. At first
sight, it seems that there is a contradiction between increased service to stores, and decreased
case fill rate to customer DC. This happened because in 2005 prior to rapid replenishment,
orders that could not be filled from stock initially could be replenished within the 48 hour lead
time. But in 2006, that same unfilled part of the order would have to be cut immediately; there
would not be time to replenish stocks from other distribution centers or plants. The difference
between Case Fill before the pilot project (year 2005) and after the pilot project (year 2006)
shows the percentage of cases that were available immediately, versus what percentage of cases
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were available the next day. So 96.2% of all ordered cases were in-stock, while presumably 1.5%
could have been shipped the next day.
Let us illustrate this phenomenon using an actual order. In 2005, a large customer
ordered 132 cases of Progresso Chicken Noodle Soup every day. On Monday an order for 132
arrived, and though only 100 cases were available in the customer distribution center, the other
32 would be arriving at the distribution center the next day. Because of the 48-hour lead time,
there was time to wait for the additional 32 cases, and the case fill rate was 100%. However, if
the customer expected deliveries within 24 hours, the additional 32 cases would have been cut
from the original order (with a case fill rate of 76%) and added to a separate order for the next
day (with a case fill rate of 100%). The resulting case fill rate under the rapid replenishment
system is an average of 76% and 100%, or 88%. This shows that though case fill has decreased
by 12%, the actual number and delivery times of shipped cases to the customer has not changed.
4.11.2 The Relation between Case Fill to Customer Distribution Center and
Customer Demand
The Case Fill metric is not only affected by General Mills policies, but also by the changing
nature of Giant Eagle demand. Although the supply policy of General Mills plants to General
Mills distribution centers remained unchanged, Giant Eagle started ordering more frequently and
in smaller quantities. Figure 13 illustrates this supply chain dynamic. We can imagine the
General Mills distribution center acting as a "company", the General Mills manufacturing
facility as the "supplier", and Giant Eagle as the "customer."
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Figure 13: Supplier-Company-Customer Model
The one distribution center that serves Giant Eagle is based out of Fort Wayne, Indiana,
and carries four weeks of sales in stock. We can apply the following theory to illustrate the
components of this inventory:
S = XL + dL*k (1)
Where s is the inventory level, L is the replenishment lead time in weeks, xL is the expected
demand over the replenishment lead time, 6L is the standard deviation that measures demand
variability, and k is the safety factor.
When rapid replenishment is implemented, the customer demand pattern changes. The
order flow becomes smoother, and the standard deviation 3 L of General Mills DC inventory stock
is decreasing. Since the inventory policy of General Mills' manufacturing facilities remains the
same (s and xL remained the same), the safety factor k will increase. The increase in safety stock
makes it easier for General Mills to meet higher service level goals.
Why were we unable to observe this case fill rate increase due to the Giant Eagle pilot
project? The reason is simple: the share of products shipped to Giant Eagle is small,
approximately 10% of Fort Wayne's volume. The change in Giant Eagle's segment of the
inventory is masked by the regular fluctuations of the other 90% of customer inventory.
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Let us calculate impacts of demand pattern change in this case. We know the average
weekly demand for Giant Eagle (v) is 10% of all shipments from Fort Wayne. Then weekly
shipments from Fort Wayne is equal to 10*v. Inventory level s is constant and equals 4 weeks of
sales, so, s = 40*v. In the same way, we can express expected demand over a replenishment
time: xL = L*10*v, where L is the replenishment lead time in weeks. We know standard
deviation of Giant Eagle sales in 2005, which was 12% or 0.12*v. For our calculations, we make
the assumption that in 2005, all companies shared a similar 48-hour lead time requirement and
have the same variation in sales. If the standard deviation of Giant Eagle sales is 0.12*v, then
the weekly standard deviation for all Fort Wayne sales is assumed to be 0. 12*v*I10. Similarly,
L = 0.12*v*410*1L. Then the formula (1) can be expressed as (2).
S = XL + JL*k (1)
40*v = 10*L*v + 0.12*v*4(10*L) *k (2)
Then we can express k as:
k = (40-10L)/(0.3795*/L) (3)
Now we need to find k. Since we know Case Fill to Customer DC is 97.7%, which is Item Fill
Rate, we can use the formula (Silver, et. al., 1998):
IFR = 1 - (L*G(k)/Q (4)
Then we can find G(k):
G(k) = (I - IFR)*Q/ 6L (5)
In our case Q = xL. Then substituting xL and 6L we have:
G(k) = (1 - 0.977)*(l0*L*v)/(0.12*v*10*qL) = 0.6061/L (6)
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Now, when we have a system of 2 equations (3) and (6) and we can find L and k for 2005. L
should be between 0 and 4 weeks. Inserting different values, we found values of L and k that
satisfy both equations. For 2005 year (Table 9):
Table 9: Safety Values Before Rapid Replenishment
6 GIANT EAGLE 2005 0.12
8FORT WAYNE 0.12
L 3.9145
G(k) 1.199
kTABLE 1.14
Now we will calculate the item fill rate in 2006, when the Giant Eagle rapid replenishment
project was implemented. We know that standard deviation for Giant Eagle sale decreased to
8%, and that Giant Eagle sales were approximately 10% of all Fort Wayne distribution center
shipments. Assuming that the weekly standard deviation for the rest of the clients remained at
12%:
8FORT WAYNE = '(FORT WAYNE 2005 2*9,10 + 8 GIANT EAGLE 2*1,10)
= 4(0.12 2*9/10+0.08 2*1/10) = 11.7% (7)
Then, since the inventory policy is the same (s, L, xL - unchanged) we can find k from (1) and
IFR for 2006 from (4).
Table 10: Fill Rate for Giant Eagle During Rapid Replenishment
6 GIANT EAGLE (weekly) 0.080
6 FORT WAYNE (weekly) 0.117
L 3.915
K 1.170
G(k) 1.229
IFR 2006  97.71%
AIFR = IFR2005 - IFR 2006 0.01%
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As we can see, the difference between 2005 and 2006 is quite small, only 0.01%. This is
why the inventory change at the Fort Wayne distribution center remains invisible. If General
Mills implements the rapid replenishment initiative for 50% or 100% of its clients in Fort Wayne
DC, then we obtain slightly more visible results. They are presented in Table 11:
Table 11: IFR for 50% and 100% Rollout of Rapid Replenishment
%Fort Wayne shipments with 24-hour lead times 50% 100%
6 GIANT EAGLE (weekly) 0.080 0.080
6 FORT WAYNE (weekly) 0.102 0.080
L 3.915 3.915
K 1.340 1.710
G(k) 1.382 1.718
IFR 97.75% 97.80%
AIFR = IFR - IFR 2005  0.05% 0.10%
Taking into account the nature of current metric calculations, we can expect the following
implications if General Mills were to expand its rapid replenishment services.
Since order flow will be smoother, and General Mills' inventory levels unchanged, then
service level to customers will increase. Under our simplified assumptions, if rapid
replenishment was rolled out to 50% of customers and inventory levels did not change, then the
IFR would increase 0.3%. If it was rolled out to all customers, IFR would increase 0.8%.
Also, General Mills can choose to offset anticipated costs of rapid replenishment by
decreasing the inventory level s to a level that corresponds to normal-replenishment service
levels (which is 97.7% in this case).
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4.11.3 Service to Customer Distribution Centers versus Service to
Customer Stores
The "Service to Stores" metric increased by 2.9%, but this value came at the expense of a
decreased "Case Fill" rate. We will walk through an extreme example to better illustrate the
contradiction between the metrics "Service To Stores" and "Case Fill" (See Figures 14 to 16
below).
Imagine that a Giant Eagle store needs 2 pallets of Cheerios on Monday and 2 pallets on
Tuesday. In a perfect world, there would be plenty of Cheerios at General Mills, and the correct
amount would flow to Giant Eagle stores on a just-in-time basis. See Figure 14.
Monday Tuesday
Giant Giant
no ServiceEagle Eagle v
DC EC To DC: 100%
Service
To Store: 100%
Figure 14: Ideal Order Fulfillment Process
But in reality, General Mills' inventories are not infinite. Fort Wayne might not be able
to meet Giant Eagle's last-minute needs if other customer orders have priority. Before rapid
replenishment, Giant Eagle's distribution center would aggregate store orders to take advantage
of scale, and place an order for 4 pallets with General Mills. In our extreme example, only 3
pallets were available at General Mills on Monday, and the remaining pallet was available on
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Tuesday. Before rapid replenishment, General Mills had 2 days to fulfill the order, so the order
was shipped on Tuesday. General Mills Case Fill to the Customer DC equaled 4/4, or 100%.
However, Service to the Stores would be only 2/(2+2) = 50% (See Figure 15).
Monday Tuesday
0 Shipped 4 Shipped
Giant Giant ServiceGian na To DC:
Eagle Eagle0%
0 Shipped 4 Shipped Service
To Store:
0/2= 0%
2/2= 100%
Overall 50%
Figure 15: Order Fulfillment Process Before Rapid Replenishment
In the case of rapid replenishment, the three available pallets from order #1 would be
shipped the same day, and the remaining pallet would be registered as a "case cut." The Giant
Eagle distribution center would place another order on Tuesday to receive any "case cuts" from
previous days. The Giant Eagle store would get the pallets when they needed them: 2 pallets on
Monday, and 2 more pallets on Tuesday. So by following the rapid replenishment process, Case
Fill to Customer DC has fallen to an average of (3/4) and (1/1), or 88%, while Service to Stores
doubled to (2+2)/(2+2) = 100%. (See Figure 16).
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Monday Tuesday
3 Shipped 1 1 Shipped Service
Giant Giant To DC:
Eagle1 Eagle @ 3/4=75%
DC DC 1/1 = 100%
Overall 88%
2 Shipped 2 Shipped
Service
To Store:
2/2 = 100%
2/2 = 100%
I Overall 100%
Figure 16: Order Fulfillment Process During the Rapid Replenishment Project
So under rapid replenishment, Service to Store metrics were up, but General Mills' main
service level metric, Case Fill to Distribution Center, suffered significantly.
4.11.4 Impact of Rapid Replenishment on Customer Inventory
"Days of Supply of Inventory at Customer DC" is a metric which was reduced by 6 days, from
16.8 to 10.8 days. This change in inventory management, by moving from forecast-based levels
to order-based levels, represents the biggest visible value for Giant Eagle. Giant Eagle inventory
can be broken down into the following parts: excess, promotional, cycle, and safety stock (see
Figure 17).
54
r Excess
Inventory Function of trust in data a
and systems capabilities.
Promotional
Stock/ Function of Price.
Deals
Cycle Function of expected dem
Stock lead time, and expected rc
Safety Function of demand varialStock lead time variability.
Figure 17: Breakdown of Giant Eagle Inventory
bility, and
There are four reasons a customer keeps stock on hand. The first is to have stock on hand
to sell. The second is to protect against surges in demand. The third is because a customer does
not fully trust systems to be accurate. The fourth reason to buy stock is because a customer can
sometimes get products at lower rate, and stocks up for when the prices rise.
The biggest inventory reductions have been achieved by a tremendous increase in supply
chain trust between operating partners and their systems. This increase in trust was due to the
close attention that Giant Eagle employees enjoy through their collaborations with General Mills.
Broken down into functional uses of inventory, reductions came from:
* Reduced lead time (from 48 hours to 24 hours), hence reduced Cycle Stock
* Reduced fluctuation of orders (standard deviation reduced from 12% to 8%),
hence reduced Safety Stock
* Reduced Excess Inventory as a result closer relations between Giant Eagle and
General Mills
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* Reduced Promotional Stock, as a result of improved forecast and increased
pricing collaboration between Giant Eagle and General Mills
4.12 Summary of Rapid Replenishment Costs
The following group of metrics describes the major cost implications of rapid replenishment to
General Mills: case picking, truckload utilization, and transportation costs.
Case Picking increased 19.5%, such that 38 of every 100 cases were not ordered in full
pallet quantities. Since orders in 2006 were smaller, it was less likely that Giant Eagle ordered in
full pallets, and instead included more individual cases or layers. As a result it takes additional
labor hours at General Mills' Fort Wayne distribution center to prepare Giant Eagle orders.
General Mills estimated that layer picking adds $1 to $1.50 to the cost of shipping each pallet,
and case picking is $0.25 per case. Pallets have an average of 64 cases and 5 layers. The
incremental picking cost is a part of the total cost of rapid replenishment policies for General
Mills.
Truckload utilization decreased 16.7%, from 54.3% down to 37.6%, since orders are
smaller and are placed every day. Delivery frequency has increased while sales volume remained
stable. To increase truck utilization, General Mills started to ship turn and promotion orders
together in January 2007. General Mills also studied how best to help proactive, collaborative,
and neighborly customers to join orders to obtain full truckload shipments.
Total transportation costs increased because the number of trucks going out increased by
25%. To try and offset these costs, General Mills began to investigate backhaul opportunities
from Pittsburgh and Cleveland, and also negotiated financial concessions from Giant Eagle.
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4.13 Incremental Cost per Case
To judge the operational impact of rapid replenishment, we found the incremental costs for all
General Mills functions that were affected by this project. We were able to collect empirical
data from transportation, warehousing, customer service, and information technology
representatives that were involved in serving Giant Eagle. Using the total number of cases
shipped in 2006, 110,000 equivalent cases per week, we found various operational costs per case
associated with rapid replenishment. We found that the rapid replenishment project cost General
Mills an additional 4% of their 2006 gross margin.
Most of the cost of rapid replenishment was due to increasing transportation costs
discussed in Section 4.12. Transportation costs increased approximately 25%; the number of
shipments to Giant Eagle rose to 31 trucks per week. Truckload utilization also decreased from
54.3% to 37.6%, showing that rapid replenishment is 69% as efficient as regular replenishment
processes. The cost of the additional truckloads came to 3.8% of General Mills' margins.
Case handling costs increased by 19.5%, from 18.6% to 38.1%. According to estimations
of warehouse staff, every pallet that was "case picked" or gathered case by case, or layer by
layer, adds at least $1 of expenses, but can be as expensive as $0.25 per case. The average
number of cases in one pallet of dry goods is 64 cases, but can range from 24 to 210 cases per
pallet. A liberal estimate of case picking costs, if we assume 19.5% of 110,000 cases were
picked, comes to 1% of General Mills' margins.
General Mills saw increased customer service workload to serve Giant Eagle in the pilot
project. The information technology and demand planning teams were also impacted. Though
no additional personnel were added to these teams to directly support Giant Eagle efforts, we
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expect that a significant number of man hours were borrowed from other General Mills
businesses and projects. We estimate that the cost of increased workload was similar to that of
hiring at least one customer service representative.
Cutting the order-to-delivery time in half affected all functions of General Mills supply
chain organization. If General Mills were to pursue similar projects with other customers, the
costs as well as the benefits would multiply. The following chapter includes specific
recommendations for how General Mills can decrease the operating costs discussed above.
Increasing supply chain efficiencies are necessary for successful duplication of this service
initiative.
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5 Recommendations
This section proposes changes in the organizational structure, performance metrics, information
systems, and operating requirements that General Mills should employ to ensure successful and
profitable rapid replenishment projects.
5.1 Customer Teams
Close collaboration with a customer, deep understanding of his business, timely reaction
on disruptions are the keys to successful implementation of a rapid replenishment initiative.
Dedicated cross-functional customer teams can be a tool of such level of collaboration. Such a
team should include Sales & Marketing, Logistics, Warehousing, IT, and Manufacturing
representatives. This team will be focused on implementation of rapid replenishment process and
on how to create more profit from General Mills products with a customer. Such teams should
obtain support from top managers and be managed by a seasoned executives, who are
entrepreneurial in nature and experienced in managing business. Members of customer teams
must have a mindset of continuous improvements to fine tune structure, roles and processes.
Currently General Mills has only customer teams in its sales organization to interface
with customers such as Wal-Mart and Giant Eagle. In the sales organization, dedicated customer
teams can be created to work with the largest and most collaborative customers. We also believe
that customer teams will help to bring together competing goals of different functions. For
example, manufacturing which is driven by utilization and sales which is concerned about
customer service.
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5.2 Customer Readiness Evaluation
In the course of our discussions with different functional groups, we identified key requirements
that would help General Mills stay profitable, should it need to adopt a rapid replenishment
policy with any other demanding customers. These requirements are summarized in the
following table.
Table 12: Customer Readiness Evaluation
Requirement Dimension Reason
Scale 1% revenue Partnership In Place
Truck Availability Available in Peak Baking Season 3PLs Partnering with GMI
Consolidation Full layers or pallets Low Operating Costs
Order Placement Create Orders Every Day Rapid Replenishment Key Need
Advance Ship Notices In place and useable Necessary for Increase in Deliveries
EDI Orders go directly into SAP Lower Handling Costs
Drop-Shipments Accept Drops, Mark as Delivered Increases Warehouse Productivity
Location Backhaul exists Cover Cost of Additional Truckloads
Price Pass Savings on to Consumers Drives sales
Growth Positive Sales Growth Protects Overall Order Volume
Customer Pick Up Customer Assumes Truck Cost Low Operating Costs
Truck Scheduling No Phones or Faxes Used Low Scheduling Costs
Direct Plant Ships Customer accepts and order DPS Low Handling Costs
A customer has to be evaluated for the following characteristics before they can be
considered for shorter lead times. Scale: Is the customer ordering at least 1% of General Mills
revenue? The sales force believed they could only provide such service to their largest
customers, and suggested this 1% metric. Collaboration: Are they willing to cover the costs of
additional trucks on a real-time basis? Consolidation: Are customers willing to only order in
full layers or pallets? Order placement systems: Are customers ready to forecast demand and
create orders every day? Order acceptance systems: Can the customer's systems and people
react to daily Advance Ship Notices? Can their distribution centers handle the increase in
deliveries? Electronic Data Interchange: Can customers place orders directly into General
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Mills' SAP database? Drop-Shipments: Can customers accept dropped trailers at their
distribution centers, and mark them as delivered? Location: Do backhaul opportunities exist
near the customer? If General Mills cannot organize backhauls, will the customer accept the
costs of additional truckloads? Price: Will customers pass any savings in inventory holding
costs on to their consumers?
General Mills would prefer customers that also meet the following criteria, in addition to
the requirements mentioned above. Growth: Is the customer's business growing? Do they
expect total order volumes to increase? Customer Pick Up (CPU): Can customers accept
responsibility for transportation? Will they pay for orders even if they are not picked up on
time? Automated Truck Scheduling: Can customers use an IT system instead of phones and
faxes to alleviate scheduling problems during high volume (SOND) months? Direct Plant
Ships: Can systems order Direct Plant Ships?
General Mills can offer all of its customers short lead times, but it would only remain
profitable to do so if certain restrictions were placed on the supply chain operations. If General
Mills wants to keep its service levels high, supply chain collaborators need to be picked
carefully. General Mills needs to evaluated whether each candidate is ideal for increased
collaboration.
5.3 Rapid Replenishment Metrics
This section continues the analysis of rapid replenishment by looking at key process indicators,
and discusses how service levels and asset utilization goals are related. We outline procedural
improvements that can help General Mills achieve consistency and accuracy of current metrics.
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We propose a set metrics that display rapid replenishment costs and benefits to both General
Mills and their collaborative customers.
When studying the data provided by General Mills, we noticed that the transportation
cost metric is not measured consistently. In 2005, prior to rapid replenishment, this
transportation metric only included the cost of freight, fuel, and unloading charges. But in 2006,
during rapid replenishment, transportation costs also reflected gains from backhaul opportunities,
as well as savings from financial concessions. Since such gains and savings are not articulated
separately, the data gathered in 2006 conceals the true behavior of the original transportation
costs, leading to incorrect perceptions of rapid replenishment impacts. To keep from drawing the
wrong conclusions, we suggest arranging transportation gains into a new metric, Transportation
Savings. It will help measure "apples with apples" and control transportation costs.
We also propose to track all the incremental costs relative to rapid replenishment across
General Mills functional groups to control cost efficiency. These incremental costs originate
from warehousing, transportation, customer service and IT expenses. Those costs can be
summarized in two new metrics - Total Rapid Replenishment Cost Per Case and Total Annual
Rapid Replenishment Cost as it was shown in section 4.13. These two metrics can also measure
the cost effectiveness of cross functional customer teams mentioned in section 5.1.
We suggest General Mills changes their approach to measuring customer service. As it
was showed in section 4.11, General Mills' current service metric, Case Fill to Customer DC,
measures the performance of General Mills' supply chain rather than their direct impact on
clients' businesses. To measure customer service, General Mills should use metrics that reflect
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the performance that is directly visible to clients. Store Out Of Stocks and Service To Stores are
the best examples.
Why are Store Service and Out Of Stocks better? Because although Case Fill to Customer
DC can be easily and precisely measured, this metric does not measure the benefits of rapid
replenishment to consumers. In its customer service focus, General Mills should not be
scrutinizing the customer DC, but instead share its clients' focuses on stores and end-consumers.
Store Out Of Stock and Service To Stores are the metrics that set the right end goal, and can
measure the true benefits of collaboration.
There are some difficulties with Store Out Of Stock and Service to Store metrics. First,
General Mills cannot measure or control these metrics directly, but can only receive this data
aggregated from clients, or sampled from expensive third parties such as Nielsen. Currently only
a few collaborative customers such as Giant Eagle provide General Mills with their internal
performance metrics. Second, Store Out of Stock and Service to Stores are difficult to measure
because they can be changed by clients' actions. Third, not all clients measure those metrics
often or consistently. For example, Giant Eagle only measures Store Out of Stocks at a
particular store only once a month. Despite all the problems mentioned above, Store Out of
Stock and Service to Stores more accurately reflect General Mills' customer service
effectiveness than Case Fill to Customer DC.
Store Out Of Stock can also indicate the impact of rapid replenishment on General Mills
sales. The lower this metric is, the more product is available for consumer purchase. The higher
the availability, the greater the chance of an item selling. The more that an item sells, the more
money both General Mills and their customer makes.
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We also think that Perfect Order, as detailed in Figure 18 below, can be better metric
than Case Fill in measuring General Mills' order fulfillment process. Case Fill only reflects how
many cases were shipped at the end of the order fulfillment process. Whereas Perfect Order
measures all stages of the order fulfillment process. Since rapid replenishment deals solely with
non-promotional or "turn" orders, we suggest measuring "turn" and promotion orders separately.
General Mills should set separate targets for "Perfect Order for Turn Orders" and "Perfect Order
for Promotion Orders." Because promotions often drive 80% or 90% of a SKU's sales, the
Perfect Order target for promotional items should be higher for that of non-promotional items.
To design an ideal metric portfolio to measure the effects of rapid replenishment
implementation, we identify several criteria. First, the number of metrics should be small. The
metric portfolio should describe only those variables that are expected to change due to
shortening lead times. Also, the portfolio should capture all three operational performance
objectives (customer responsiveness, efficiency, and asset utilization) which must be in
alignment to drive success, profitability, and growth. Such metrics, or Key Performance
Indicators (KPI), can be
" Total Rapid Replenishment Cost Per Case to measure cost effectiveness (see
Section 4.13). A sum of incremental warehousing, transportation, customer
service and IT costs, divided by the number of the cases shipped.
* Store Out Of Stock to measure the performance of clients, as well as the impact of
rapid replenishment on client processes.
" Perfect Order For Nonpromotional Orders to measure the complete performance
of General Mills' supply chain.
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Perfect order is the order that is complete, in the right place, undamaged, and delivered to
the customer distribution center on-time. Perfect order is calculated as a product of error-free
rates of each stage of a purchase order. These components are illustrated in Figure 18.
Order Warehouse Delivered Shipped Invoiced
Per Entry X Pick X on Time X without X CorrectlyerAccuracy Accuracy Damage
Figure 18: Perfect Order
These three KPIs, Cost Per Case, Out Of Stocks, and Perfect Order, should be used to
measure rapid replenishment by managers in all functions and by cross-functional customer
service groups.
The rest of the General Mills' metric portfolio are subsets of these key performance
indicators. Metrics such as freshness, service to stores, and days of supply at the customer help
General Mills understand store performance. Metrics that affect perfect order include order entry
accuracy, warehouse case pick, delivery timeliness, damaged goods, and invoicing accuracy.
Metrics such as truck utilization, the number of cases shipped, the costs of freight, customer
service, and warehouse expenses all affect the overall cost per case metric. If General Mills were
to increase the number of customers that it offered short lead times to, all of these metrics would
be impacted.
5.4 Information Technology
General Mills' information systems were described in section 3.8 of this document. This section
recommends improvements in technology that General Mills should employ to successfully
pursue more rapid replenishment projects with innovative customers like Giant Eagle.
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General Mills' SAP APO system is efficient for reporting current status of inventory
levels and current orders, and EDI systems are in place for automating the transfer of data, but
the systems have shortcomings on the customer-data integration and forecasting sides. General
Mills has the capital to fund major changes to its information system. Doing so could increase
the quality and speed of information processing, as well as indirectly increase the accuracy of
forecasts.
We suggest the following additional features will help General Mills collaborate with its
customers. A vendor managed inventory system that is compatible with current systems which
also integrates customer demand forecasts. General Mills is working on a program that can
integrate customer Point of Sale (POS) data into existing forecasting systems.
In addition to these systems, small modifications to existing systems can be done with
minimal investments, leveraging current resources. These include automatic forms that populate
with SAP database information, automatic exception handling, UCCnet data synchronization,
and Automatic Truck Scheduling. These small investments are detailed below.
Currently operating costs such as truckload utilization and layer pick are not readily
visible to the logistics planners that are making manufacturing decisions. If these operating costs
were automatically pulled from BEx, a SAP reporting system, and integrated into Sales and
Operating Process (S&OP) meetings, then decisions could be made with these costs in mind.
Automatic forms would be a minimal investment for General Mills' information technology
team.
Automatic exception handling would free up the time of General Mills' customer service
representatives and also of customer procurement teams. For example, if a non-promotional
order is smaller than a full truckload, General Mills representatives often hold that order until it
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can be combined with other small orders, to increase truckload utilization. If this order was
automatically delayed by SAP, then a customer service rep would be saved a phone call and a
purchase order modification.
Another solution to order problems are global data synchronization processes. UCCnet is
a non-profit subsidiary of the Uniform Code Council that provides global product registry and
data synchronization standards. General Mills could implement UCCnet's Global Registry
software to introduce data synchronization. This will help reduce inaccurate product data such
as size, weight, or quantity per case. This system offers consistent format data between
applications and companies.
Automated truck scheduling and planning are applications would also help General
Mills' operations. These optimize the usage of available fleets of third-party trucks, as well as
scheduling and optimizing truck routes. This system can be expanded so that customers can
combine nearby orders to maximize truckload utilization.
These systems create visibility and alignment between customer and supplier operations,
which enable the rapid replenishment process to succeed. They will also create visibility for
operating costs, which may constrain the rapid replenishment process.
5.5 Promotions
This section describes recommendations of how promotion orders of the companies participating
in rapid replenishment should be handled.
Around 50% of all Giant Eagle orders are promotional ones. Since such orders are placed
at least four weeks in advance, they should be forecasted, planned and shipped differently than
turn orders. First, promotional forecasting and planning should be arranged in collaboration with
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a customer to avoid duplication of efforts, costs and differences in forecasts between General
Mills and a customer.
Second, product availability on store shelves is even more important for promotion orders
than for turn orders because promotions are limited in time. From this point of view, case fill
metrics for promotional orders should be higher than for turn orders. Additionally, since
promotion orders are placed in advance, General Mills has a much longer time to prepare such
orders for shipment. In case of Giant Eagle we believe that case fill for promotional orders
should be above 99%.
Promotional order planning is the most difficult and unpredictable part of demand
planning. And since General Mills serves both promotional and turn orders from the same
distribution centers, promotional orders influence the fulfillment of turn orders. Quite often a
customer notices a promotion does better than expected, and orders an additional quantity. This
additional promotion request might cause a disruption in the service of non-promotional orders.
To forecast properly, General Mills demand planning groups need to be informed of the causes
of spikes in demand. Customer scorecards can be used to track the frequency of short-lead-time
promotional orders to create an accurate record of customer demand patterns.
In 2006, General Mills learned that increasing its operating costs in the short run led to
enhanced customer performance and satisfaction in the longer term. We expect that more
changes in organization, information systems, and order processes can only enhance the
customer relationships it enjoys, such as the one with Giant Eagle.
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6 Conclusions
Increasing the supply chain velocity between supplier General Mills and their customer Giant
Eagle had both positive and negative consequences for both players. These are outlined in the
following sections.
6.1 Benefits for General Mills
This section finalizes benefits of rapid replenishment for General Mills.
First, rapid replenishment facilitates customer retention. General Mills provides its
customers with a superior level service, responding to and anticipating their needs. This strategy
is in sync with current CPG industry trends (GMA, 2005). CPG retailers are looking and
pressing for shorter order-to-delivery cycle and higher case-fill rate. Additionally, once such
complicated process as rapid replenishment is developed and installed, it becomes extremely
difficult and costly for customers to change suppliers.
Second, since rapid replenishment brings for clients such benefits as reduced Out of
Stock and increased Case Fill from customer DC to store, increase in sales will be expected
eventually. But as in the case of Giant Eagle pilot project in year 2006 such gains can be offset
by negative processes. From this point of view it is important to choose growing companies for
the next rapid replenishment projects, since implementing this initiative General Mills bears
significant costs.
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Third, rapid replenishment helps improve forecast accuracy and reduce demand
uncertainty. Since Giant Eagle places orders every day, it helps to reduce bull-whip effect and
smooth goods flow from General Mills to Giant Eagle. On the other hand, small everyday orders
can be a very good source of real-time demand signals for General Mills manufacturing and
demand planning.
Fourth, such high level of collaboration helps build better relationships with clients,
promotes better and continuous communication and helps obtain insights to customers'
organization and concerns, leading to enhanced decision-making.
Fifth, once having implemented more rapid replenishment projects with customers, and
leveraging a trade-off between level of inventory and service levels, General Mills can choose to
decrease its own inventory levels. Shortening all order-to-delivery cycles can also improve the
company's cash-to-cash performance since inventory will be moving faster.
6.2 Benefits for Giant Eagle
This section summarizes benefits of rapid replenishment for Giant Eagle.
The most visible benefit that Giant Eagle already achieved with rapid replenishment is
inventory reduction. In 2006, the days of inventory parameter was reduced 35%. Inventory
reduction was one of the main goals of Giant Eagle in this project.
The second benefit is reduced out of stocks, which potentially helped to increase sales.
Although Giant Eagle had declined sales in 2006, the result might have been much worse if
Giant Eagle had not had improved the out-of-stock figure.
The third benefit is a potential sales increase. Lower out-of-stocks increase General
Mills' product availability, raising the probability that a consumer will buy them.
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The fourth benefit is reduced lead time, which helps Giant Eagle be more flexible in
reacting to unpredicted demand.
6.3 Costs of Rapid Replenishment for General Mills
and for Giant Eagle
The main incremental costs that are related to rapid replenishment for General Mills and Giant
Eagle are transportation, warehousing, customer service and IT costs. These are discussed in
detail below.
The cost driver for transportation expenses is the number of trucks used to deliver
products to the customer. In the case of Giant Eagle's pilot project, as the number of trucks
increased, the truck utilization declined. But General Mills offset these incremental costs by
using backhaul opportunities and negotiating financial concessions with Giant Eagle.
The cost driver for warehousing is case picking. Since the number of Giant Eagle orders
has increased and the number of each SKU has decreased, there is more case picking. Each case
picked pallet represents $1 in additional warehousing costs for General Mills
The cost driver for General Mills' customer service is the number of people working in
the Customer Service Center. If General Mills were to offer 24-hour order-to-delivery times to
more customers, the customer service centers would have to hire additional employees to handle
the increased number of orders and exception handling. Also, if General Mills created cross-
functional teams to better address customer profitability, the personnel costs would skyrocket.
Similarly, a cost driver for IT is the number of working hours spent by personnel
implementing changes needed for serving rapid replenishment. In the last year, the Customer
Service Center has required more support in database reporting.
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The main incremental costs that are related to implementation of rapid replenishment
from the Giant Eagle side are financial concessions, warehousing, and supplier management
costs. By sharing cost information, cost drivers that define General Mills expenses became cost
drivers for Giant Eagle. The difference is that Giant Eagle's expenses are initially lower. Some
concessions are directly tied to the order-to-delivery cycle, but some are not. For example, the
unload fee concession depends on the number of trucks. But concessions such as unsaleable
deductions are not tied to any cost drivers, and are on-off in nature. Both of these concessions
were addressed during the collaboration between General Mills and Giant Eagle.
Incremental warehousing and supplier management costs include unloading and other
operations that take place at Giant Eagle's warehouses. Rapid replenishment increases the
number of shipments arriving from General Mills, and so additional employees and warehouse
space are required to manage these. Also the increased hours of collaboration with General Mills
demand planners increases the time that Giant Eagle spends on procurement.
Table 13 summarizes the costs and benefits that General Mills and Giant Eagle saw
during the rapid replenishment pilot.
Table 13: Cost-Benefit Overview of Rapid Replenishment
General Mills Giant Eagle
Benefit Customer Retention Shorter Lead Times
Smoother Demand Signal Higher Supplier Service Levels
Improved Forecast Accuracy Reduced Out Of Stock
Shorter Cash-Cash Cycle Lower Inventory
Cost High Transportation Costs More Warehouse Handling
Initially Higher Inventory More Warehouse Scheduling
Increased Customer Service Hours Higher Order Placement Costs
More Warehouse Handling Unloading Fees Dropped
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6.4 Future Research
Business literature shows that there are other supply chain initiatives that can improve
company's performance, such as vendor managed inventory, collaborative planning forecasting
and replenishment, and demand driven supply networks. Success or failure of these projects
depends on the quality of implementation, on how strong the company is willing to commit and
put effort into overcoming setbacks and adjusting particular models to company reality.
There are some related issues that can be explored and developed further in support of
high velocity supply. The impact of using Point-of-Sale data on velocity needs to be quantified.
Also, the needs of a refrigerated supply chain need to be outlined and explored as a baseline for
rapid replenishment. A process for integrating a vendor managed inventory process within the
rapid replenishment framework needs to be outlined, as well as steps for automating exception
handling in General Mills' order receiving process.
General Mills' rapid replenishment initiative is in line with industrial trends. Leading
consumer product manufacturers are reducing order-to-delivery times and increasing service
levels for customers. The project with Giant Eagle shows how General Mills can benefit by
addressing customer profitability head-on. We expect that investing in new services, such as
Customer Teams, Automated Truck Scheduling, and BEx Cost Reporting, will create value for
General Mills. Offering services to other innovative customers will positively impact customer
loyalty. Also, creating such programs creates incentives for customers to be communicative and
cooperative, increasing supply chain efficiencies that will ultimately benefit the consumer.
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